FILED JULIA ROMANO (SBN 260857) jromano@kslaw.com KING & SPALDING LLP OCT 2 3 2018 633 West Fifth Street **Suite 1700** CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT Los Angeles, CA 90071 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Telephone: +1 213 443 4355 Facsimile: +1 213 443 4310 6 Attorneys for Objector Ms. Egla Arely Velasquez Molina 7 8 [Additional Counsel Listed On Second Page] 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 M.M.M., on behalf of his minor child, Case No. 3:18-cv-1832-DMS 12 J.M.A., et al. 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III, 16 Attorney General of the United States, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 Case No. 18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Ms. L, et al., 19 Plaintiffs, **CLASS ACTION** 20 v. **OBJECTION OF MS. EGLA ARELY** 21 VELASQUEZ MOLINA TO THE U.S. Immigration and Customs 22 **OCTOBER 5, 2018 SETTLEMENT** Enforcement, et al., **AGREEMENT** 23 Defendants. 24 25 26 27 28



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Pursuant to the Court's October 5, 2018 Order preliminarily approving the class settlement in this action (the "Settlement"), Ms. Egla Arely Velasquez Molina ("Ms. Velasquez Molina"), a citizen of Honduras seeking asylum in the United States and presently detained at the Port Isabel Detention Center ("PIDC"), files this objection seeking clarification that she is included within the definition of the plaintiff class in the Settlement. The grounds for this objection are set forth below.

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Ms. Velasquez Molina, a thirty year old citizen of Honduras, is the sole primary caregiver, legal guardian, and biological aunt of E.C., a ten-year old girl who has lived with Ms. Velasquez Molina since the murder of E.C.'s biological father, Ms. Velasquez Molina's biological nephew, and has been in the sole care of Ms. Velasquez Molina since the death of E.C.'s biological father in 2017. Copies of official documents from the Honduran government appointing Ms. Velasquez Molina legal guardian for E.C., together with certified translations, are collectively attached to this Objection as Exhibit A.

Ms. Velasquez Molina and E.C. fled Honduras to escape threats of physical violence and death and crossed the U.S. border in June 2018. Pursuant to the Government's "zero tolerance" policy, Ms. Velasquez Molina and E.C. were separated from one another shortly after they crossed the U.S. border. Ms. Velasquez Molina is detained at the Port Isabel Detention Center in Texas, while her *de facto* daughter, E.C., is currently housed at a foster-care facility in San Antonio, Texas.

The separation from her daughter caused extreme emotional trauma for Ms. Velasquez Molina, as would be the case with any parent. Ms. Velasquez Molina was in this traumatized state when she was given her credible fear interview as part of the asylum process, which resulted in a negative finding by the Asylum Officer.

On October 17, 2018, Ms. Velasquez Molina filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, among other things, a *de novo* credible fear interview conducted in good faith, which is one element of the relief granted to similarly situated detained immigrants in the Settlement. A copy of Ms. Velasquez Molina's complaint in her District of Columbia action is attached as Exhibit B to this Objection. In her complaint, Ms. Velasquez Molina alleges that because she was emotionally traumatized by the Government's forced family separation policy at the time her initial credible fear interview was conducted, she was denied her due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

There are numerous scholarly articles that describe the devastating emotional harm caused by family separations. *See, e.g.*, Gaiane Nazarian, "Separation Due to Deportation: Psychological, Emotional, and Economic Affect on Children of Deported Parents," *Cal. State San Bernardino* (2014). The Settlement in this action is a tacit acknowledgement by Defendants that family separations cause significant emotional damage to all concerned. The *de novo* credible fear interview provided for in the Settlement is obviously based on the understanding that a credible fear interview administered while the detainee was emotionally traumatized from being separated from her child is inherently unfair and a denial of due process.

The Settlement calls for a *de novo* credible fear interview for certain immigrant "parents," a term that is not defined in the Settlement or in the original class certification order from this Court. *See* Tentative Settlement Agreement, Doc. 247 at 32. The class certification order and the Settlement expressly exclude certain parents from the class, such as those with criminal histories or with communicable diseases, but do not exclude legal guardians or any other type of parent. As shown below, Ms. Velasquez Molina is properly included within the

plaintiff class and should be afforded the relief provided in the Settlement.

II. MS. VELASQUEZ MOLINA SHOULD BE IN THE SETTLEMENT CLASS

A. Legal Guardians Should Be Treated The Same As Biological Parents Under The Settlement

As shown in the documents attached to this Objection as Exhibit A, Ms. Velasquez Molina is the official legal guardian of her young niece, E.C., and has been her guardian since gang members murdered her father in 2017. Counsel for Ms. Velasquez Molina have engaged with counsel for the Defendants in Ms. Velasquez Molina's District of Columbia action seeking their agreement that official legal guardians such as Ms. Velasquez Molina should be within the scope of the Settlement and, therefore, entitled to a *de novo* credible fear interview. To date, Defendants have not agreed that Ms. Velasquez Molina is within the definition of "parent" in the Settlement, and, in a related case with the same Defendants, Lesbi Nohemi Martinez Martinez v. ICE, et al., Case No. 18-02231-PLF (D.D.C.), have stated their position that the term "parent" does not refer to legal guardians such as Ms. Velasquez Molina. However, Defendants' position is not only inconsistent with the meaning and spirit of this Court's class certification order, the Settlement Agreement and Defendants' arguments before this Court, it is also inconsistent with federal law and Defendants' own immigration policy.

As an initial matter, this Court's June 26, 2018 order certified the following class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for purposes of Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim:

All adult parents who enter the United States at or between designated ports of entry who (1) have been, are,

¹ Ms. Martinez has filed an objection to the proposed settlement on the same grounds as expressed herein. See Doc. 282 (October 15, 2018).

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or will be detained in immigration custody by the DHS, and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child."

Doc. 82 at 17 (emphasis added).

This Court provided only one modification to the definition of parent, for purposes of determining class members. Specifically, the Court held that the class "does not include migrant parents with criminal history or communicable disease, or those who are in the interior of the United States or subject to the [President's June 20, 2018 Executive Order which reversed the administrations family separation policy]." Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Secretary of Homeland Security is prohibited from "detain[ing] an alien family together when there is a concern that detention of an alien child with the child's alien parent would pose a risk to the child's welfare." Ms. Velasquez Molina's and her daughter's forced separation fell within the class definition. As of the date of the Court's June 26 class certification order, Ms. Velasquez Molina "ha[d] been...detained in immigration custody by the DHS, ... [she had] a minor child who ... [wa]s separated from [her] by DHS and [had been] detained in ORR custody, absent a determination that [she was]... unfit or present[ed] a danger to [her] child." See Order Granting In Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 82) at 17. The proposed Settlement Agreement largely tracks the certified class definition, referencing "all adult alien parents who entered the United States at . . . designated ports of entry with their child(ren), and . . . before the effective date of the [settlement] agreement . . . were detained in immigration custody by DHS" and "ha[d] a child who was or is separated from them by DHS and, . . . was housed in ORR custody..., absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child." As with the certified class definition, the Settlement Agreement expressly excludes from the class alien parents with criminal histories

or a communicable disease. *See* Doc. 247 at 32. Nothing in the terms of the original class definition or in the proposed agreement excludes legal guardians.

In an earlier status conference in this case, the Government suggested that non-biological parents could properly be considered to be within the class definition. During the July 6th status conference, in discussing the difficulties that the Government would face in establishing "parentage," and requesting "some relief to allow for that process" given "the inherent delays" in establishing such parentage, the Government said "[t]here are situations, for example in a nonbiological parent situation, where the -- where there may need to be additional review of paperwork, perhaps communications with the consulates." Doc. 93 at 12. The Court noted that "the class is defined to include parents . . . arguably that could mean adoptive parents, nonbiological." *Id*.

Further, federal law has defined legal guardianships as "a judicially-created relationship between child and caretaker which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining as evidenced by the transfer to the caretaker of the following parental rights with respect to the child: protection, education, care and control of the person, custody of the person, and decision-making." 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a)(2). The law recognizes that the strong emotional and legal bonds between legal guardians and their minor charges are the same as those between parents and their biological children, thereby granting legal guardians equal or substantially similar rights. For example, when consent is required for treatment of substance abuse by a minor, consent by either a parent or guardian is acceptable under federally funded programs. 42 C.F.R § 2.14(b). Similarly, under the regulations implementing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, parents and guardians are granted equal authority to make decisions relating to the access to, and release of, protected health information of unemancipated minors. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3).

Immigration statutes and policy guidance also treat parents and legal guardians interchangeably, while distinguishing them from individuals with a more distant connection to the minor child. For example, guidance issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on the "Detention and Removal of Alien Parents or Legal Guardians" makes no differentiation between the two (Exhibit C hereto). Similarly, the Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR"), in its guidance concerning unaccompanied minors, treats parents and legal guardians as similarly situated and distinguishable from other parties (Exhibit C hereto). Not only does ORR group parents and legal guardians into "Category 1" for purposes of release and the type of background check required, but it also "gives preference to a parent or legal guardian when determining release plans." See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied, at §§ 2.2.1, 2.5.1 (Jan. 30, 2015) (Exhibit C hereto).

Moreover, federal law defines "unaccompanied alien child" to be a minor child without lawful immigration status in the United States who has "no parent or legal guardian . . . available to provide care and physical custody." 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). Defendants forcibly separated Ms. Velasquez Molina's minor child from her, in the same manner in which they separated minor children from their parents in this case, and then deemed Ms. Velasquez Molina's child to be an unaccompanied minor because her legal guardian was no longer available to provide care and physical custody.

Defendants' position with respect to the treatment of legal guardians is inconsistent with the underlying zero tolerance policy which resulted in these forced separations. On June 15, 2018, as the extent of the administration's family separation policy became evident and the national outrage grew, the Department of Homeland Security issued responses to frequently asked questions regarding the administration's zero tolerance policy. In that document, DHS considers legal

guardians "parents" for purposes of the zero tolerance policy. In response to the question "Why are Parents Being Separated from Their Children?" HHS responded that DHS "may separate a parent *or legal guardian* from his or her child for several reasons . . . [including] if a parent *or legal guardian* is referred for criminal prosecution." Similarly in response to the question "How can I communicate with my child?" HHS responded "for parents *or legal guardians* detained in ICE custody, ICE and HHS will work to schedule regular communication with their children in HHS custody . . ." (See Exhibit D hereto) (emphasis added).

The similar treatment of parents and legal guardians is not limited to federal law or policy, but is evident under state law as well. For example, attached as Exhibit E to this Memorandum is a summary of the rights and obligations of legal guardians published by the Judicial Branch of the California State Government. In that summary, the California Judicial Branch states that legal guardians "have the same legal responsibilities as a parent" in that legal guardians must provide the child with basic needs such as housing, food, and medical care, and also decide where the child lives and attends school. Legal guardians are also responsible for losses or damages caused by their children for whom they are guardians. These responsibilities forge bonds between legal guardians and their *de facto* children that are just as strong as those between biological parents and children. The California Judicial Branch succinctly advises potential legal guardians that "[y]ou will be like the child's parent." (Ex. E, at p. 1).

In sum, a fair reading of this Court's narrowly defined class would include Ms. Velasquez Molina and her daughter who were forcibly separated by the Government and detained in separate facilities, causing severe emotional trauma to both parent and child. Such a reading is consistent with how legal guardians have been viewed under federal law and consistent with Defendants' own immigration policies.

B. None of the Other Criteria In Settlement Class Membership
 Should Keep Ms. Velasquez Molina Out Of The Settlement Class

Although the parties' proposed Settlement largely tracks this Court's June 26, 2018 class definition, it departs from that definition in two key respects. First, the Settlement includes a requirement that the minor child who was separated from his/her adult parent be housed in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody "on or after June 26, 2018," the date of this Court's class certification order. Second, the proposed Settlement requires that the child and his or her parent "have been continuously present within the United States since June 26, 2018[.]" Doc. 247 at 32. E.C. is currently housed at an ORR custody in San Antonio, Texas. Moreover, Ms. Velasquez Molina and E.C. have been continuously in the United States since they were apprehended at the border in early June. Thus, Ms. Velasquez Molina and her daughter fall squarely within the parameters of the class.

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

WHEREFORE, Ms. Velasquez Molina respectfully requests that this Court confirm that she is within the plaintiff class for purposes of the Settlement.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Romano JULIA ROMANO

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VELASQUEZ MOLINA

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